

regions of the United States. (See Figure I) The Environmental Protection Agency has that responsibility in inland regions.

The state government is represented on the Regional Response Team (RRT) by the Texas Department of Water Resources (TDWR) and provides advice and assistance to the OSC. At the request of the OSC, state resources can be utilized directly to pick up or contain spills.

In addition to the clean-up activities conducted under the federal fund set up under Section 311 of the Federal Clean Water Act of 1977, clean-up activities can be conducted under subchapter (g), "Coastal Oil and Hazardous Spill and Prevention Control" of the Texas Water Code.³ These activities must be conducted in accord with the National Contingency Plan. The executive director of the TDWR places the resources of the state at the disposal of the OSC, if he is present, or engages in cleanup activities when directed to do so by the OSC. (See Figure II) When no OSC is present and no action is being taken by an agency of the federal government, the executive director of TDWR may act to clean up oil under Section 26.264(h)(2). (See Figure III)


Pursuant to Section 26.264(f), the TDWR and the State Department of Highways and Public Transportation (TDHW) have an existing contract relating to the manner in which Highway Department resources are to be used.

Also relating to oil spill cleanup is the State of Texas Disaster Plan which provides for the coordination of state agency efforts in the event of disasters by the Division of Disaster Emergency Services of the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS).⁴

FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT

Shortly after the IXTOC I well exploded in the Bay of Campeche, the United States Coast Guard began its preparations for the potential onslaught of oil in the waters of Texas. The command center and the regional news office were established in Corpus Christi. On July 27, 1979 Captain Roger Madson relieved Commander Joel Sipes as the Federal On-Scene Coordinator (OSC). The Scientific Coordinator was named, Mr. John Robinson of NOAA and LCDR James Paskewich


NATIONAL CONTINGENCY PLAN CONCEPTS



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FIGURE II

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR
COASTAL OIL AND HAZARDOUS SPILL PREVENTION AND CONTROL



Authority for this Organization is given by the Texas Water Code, Subchapter G, Section 26.264(h) and Section 26.266(d).


* Section 26.264(h)(1) and (h)(3) applies specifically to this situation.

--- Indicates that State of Texas resources are at the disposal of the OSC.

FIGURE III

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR
COASTAL OIL AND HAZARDOUS SPILL PREVENTION AND CONTROL

U.S. Coast Guard
On-Scene Coordinator (OSC)
(Not Present)



Authority for this Organization is given by the Texas Water Code, Subchapter G, Section 26.264(h) and Section 26.266(d).

* Section 26.264(h)(2) and (h)(3) applies specifically to this situation.

was named as the Response Coordinator. Representatives from other Federal agencies and the State of Texas were named to serve on the response team. A vulnerability study was conducted by Research Planning Institute (RPI) of Columbia, South Carolina to identify and map sensitive areas of the entire Texas coastline. In mid July, the U.S.C.G. cutter Valiant sailed with NOAA and EPA scientists aboard to obtain samples of the oil and also to chart the water currents in the Gulf. NOAA gathered data from the Coast Guard overflights in order to monitor the movement of the oil.

On August 24, 1979, Captain Roger L. Madson, U.S.C.G., testified before the Committee on Environmental Affairs. Captain Madson explained the National Contingency Plan and the role that the National Response Team and the Regional Response Team play in dealing with major oil spills. The Coast Guard, according to Captain Madson, decided that its first line of defense would be "to stop the oil from entering these bays and estuaries, and this would mean booming of the passes, starting at Brazos-Santiago, moving up to Port Mansfield, the Fish Pass below Aransas, and then Aransas Pass, itself."

When the oil was 60 miles below the Rio Grande, all organizations and equipment involved in the operation, were called in. The Navy Mark-O-Skimmer worked effectively on the mousse.

The strategy used by the Coast Guard, according to Capt. Madson's testimony, was to give highest priority to cleaning the beaches near the hotels and motels to minimize the economic impact as much as possible. Isolated areas of beaches were not cleaned at that time, stated Madson, because it was not economically feasible to clean 130 miles of beaches daily.⁵

STATE ACTIVITIES

During the 70 days from the blow out (June 3, 1979) until oil began to appear in Texas waters and on the beaches, several meetings were held to coordinate the spill response effort of state and federal agencies.

On July 13, 1979, a meeting of the Regional Response Team (RRT) was held at the Eighth Coast Guard District Headquarters in New Orleans. Dick Whittington, Deputy Director of the Texas Department of